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FOREWORD
The United States, particularly the Army, has
a long history of involvement with Cuba. It has
included, among others, the Spanish-American War
of 1898, military interventions in 1906 and 1912, the
1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion, the 1962 Missile Crisis,
counterinsurgency, and low intensity warfare in Latin
America and Africa against Cuban supported guerrilla
movements.
During the Cold War, Fidel Castro’s Communist
takeover on January 1, 1959, heightened U.S. concerns
and highlighted the threat Cuba posed as a strategic
ally of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet bloc
in the 1990s raised hopes for an end to the Communist
regime in Cuba. However, after almost 5 decades
of authoritarian one-man rule, the Cuban dictator
remains firmly in power. On July 31, his brother, Raul
Castro, assumed provisional presidential power after
an official announcement that Fidel was ill and would
undergo surgery.
This monograph is designed to contribute to the
process of understanding the strategic and political
implications attendant to Castro’s eventual demise
or incapacitation. Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz draws
attention to the need to anticipate possible transition
or succession scenarios and examines the consequences
that might follow and the role that the United States
might be called to play.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this report as part of its ongoing analytical program
in support of Army participation in national security
policy formulation and implementation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This paper serves multiple purposes, the most
important of which is contributing to the depth of
knowledge about Castro’s Cuba and Cuba’s Fidel in
a time of transition. Evidence supporting the analysis
and conclusions is derived from open sources.
Interest and concern about the unfolding Cuban
reality increased after Fidel Castro provisionally
delegated his presidential powers to his brother, Raul,
on July 31, 2006, allegedy due to a life-threatening
illness. Images of Castro collapsing while making a
speech in 2003, falling on stage and breaking his left
knee and right arm in 2004, or scoffing at reports by the
Central Intelligence Agency in 2005 that he suffered
from Parkinson’s disease while clearly favoring a limp
arm have been flashing on television screens for several
years.
This monograph examines alternative scenarios
in the twilight of Fidel Castro and in a post-Castro
Cuba. They constitute a triad of outcomes; namely,
a violent regime change, a peaceful transition to
democracy, or a dynastic succession. Regime change
is a possibility since Cuba is one of Freedom House’s
two not-free countries in the Americas and a state
sponsor of terrorism. However, after 47 years of oneman rule, a violent overthrow of the Communist
dictatorship is highly unlikely. There is no organized
armed opposition within Cuba, and the repressive
state machinery operates effectively against real or
potential enemies. The Cuban armed forces (FAR)
remain loyal after having been purged, and are tightly
controlled by Raul. In addition, on August 6, Secretary
of State Condolezza Rice publicly stated that the Bush
administration had no intention to invade Cuba.


The global war on terror, Iraq, nuclear proliferation
issues raised by Iran and North Korea, and the current
terrorist attacks against Israel are the hot foreign policy
priorities of the Bush administration. The United
States would need to feel directly threatened before
considering the use of force against Cuba. So despite
U.S. Government rhetoric in the July 5, 2006, report of
the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC)
about liberating Cuba, Castro knows that he will retain
power as long as he lives.
A peaceful transition to democracy and a free
market economy is also unlikely as long as Fidel is
alive. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there
was hope that Cuba might undergo something similar
to the “color” or “flower” revolutions that transformed
many of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike the
Europeans, however, Cuba’s Communist party and
security services remain loyal, and there is no solidarity
movement or opposition leader with a credible plan.
Cuban civil society is rather weak, and dissidents are
unable to work openly and in full coordination. More
importantly, the main reason why no color, flower, or
cedar revolution will ever occur in Cuba is that Castro
and his closest lieutenants have studied those events
very closely, identified and anticipated the relevant
contingencies, and learned how to deal with them.
A dynastic succession based on collective leadership
is the unfolding Cuban scenario. Castro wants to retain
personal power for as long as he can to protect his
dominant position and interests. To accomplish this,
first, he has sought close commercial and security ties
with China, Venezuela, Bolivia, and even the mullahs
of Iran. Next, he organized a succession process. Under
Cuban law, the first Vicepresident of the Council
of State, his brother Raul, assumes the duties of the
vi

president. Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, assumed
provisional power on Monday, July 31, following an
announcement that Fidel was ill and would undergo
surgery. Raul has physical ailments, too, and there is
no clear indication that anyone else has been groomed
to replace him.
So at age 80, the Cuban dictator’s place in history,
for better or for worse, already has been established.
For almost 50 years, the Cuban people have suffered
political repression and tyranny under his one-man
rule.
Castro’s eventual passing, the so-called “biological
solution,” would constitute good and transformative
news for Cuba if progress is made along a range of issues
from development of true and honest representative
institutions of governance to improvement of the
Cuban people’s quality of life. The overarching
American foreign policy objective should be to
pressure the successor regime while encouraging a
strong bias among Cuban elites for internally generated
democratization, the rule of law, and transparency in
reciprocity for graduated normalization of relations
with the island.
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CASTRO’S CUBA:
QUO VADIS?
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989
and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) on December 21, 1991, many predicted
an end to Fidel Castro’s Communist rule. Against all
odds, however, his totalitarian regime has survived the
devastation of its economy from the loss of billions of
dollars in Soviet economic and military subsidies, chronic
economic mismanagement, an American embargo
tightened by the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and
the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, and branding as a state
sponsor of terrorism.1
This unlikely outcome largely is owed to underestimation of Castro’s experienced political leadership,
ruthlessness, and pragmatic instinct for survival, together
with a continued lack of understanding on the part of
the United States of the political culture of his corrupt
regime. Over the years, he has outlived 10 U.S. presidents
and 16 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directors. An
unusual individual with an eidetic memory, Castro is
totally narcissistic but able to learn new tricks and teach
old ones. As Brian Lattell writes:
Since the dawning of his political career in the late
1940s Fidel Castro has demonstrated exceptional, often
remarkable leadership qualities. Few of them would be
considered admirable in a democratic society or ethical
by any standard, but they have been critical to his
success in holding on to power for more than 47 years,
longer than any other leader in the history of the Western
Hemisphere except one. Only the 19th century Brazilian
emperor, Pedro II, in power for 49 years, ruled longer
than Castro has.2



On July 31, Fidel’s brother, Raul, assumed provisional
power following an announcement that Fidel was ill and
would undergo surgery. So friend and foe alike wonder
about Castro’s capacity to rule and speculate about
what will happen to Cuba after his inevitable death
or incapacitation.3 On June 23, 2001, images of Castro
collapsing while making a speech flashed across television
screens. In May 2003, he suffered another fainting spell in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. On October 20, 2004, in Santa
Clara while leaving a graduation ceremony, he tripped
and fell on stage, breaking his left knee and right arm.
About a year later, on November 17, 2005, at the University
of Havana, Castro scoffed at reports by the CIA that he
suffered from Parkinson’s disease, insisted he would step
down if he became too ill to govern, and went on to speak
for 5 1/2 hours. On July 26 , the anniversary of the attack
on the Moncada Barracks that originated his revolution,
the eyes of the world once more turned to Bayamo, Cuba,
not only to hear what the Maximum Leader might say or
do but also for any signs of his mortality.4
This paper briefly considers alternative Cuban
scenarios in the twilight of Fidel Castro. One must
remember that he entered center stage with a bang on
January 1, 1959, and might wish to exit in the same manner.
The main purpose of this paper is to help anticipate and
deal with future contingencies in order to narrow the
choice of solutions. While it is not my intent to provide
a complete analysis of the policy options available,
a failure to deal properly with the social upheaval that
might follow the end of Castro’s reign would have
significant consequences for the United States. As
Niels Bohr once said, however, “prediction is difficult,
especially about the future.”5 It is a useful caveat to keep
in mind, for history is replete with failed prognostications
about, in Lockwood’s felicitous phrase, Castro’s Cuba
and Cuba’s Fidel.6


A TRIAD
The contentious debate over Cuba’s future direction
harks back to the early 1960s and the John F. Kennedy
administration. One of the earliest arguments was made
by RAND analysts Roberta and Albert Wohlestetter,
who put out a proposal for a study of Post-Communist
Cuba.7 Since that time, predicting the future course of
Cuba after Castro has been a popular topic that can be
viewed as a triad of potential outcomes; namely, regime
change, democratic transition, or dynastic succession. It
constitutes a useful framework for analysis and will be
examined in that order.
Regime Change.
Cuba is one of two not-free countries in the Americas,
one of six countries on the State Department list of states
sponsoring terrorism, and, in the words of Mexican
writer Carlos Fuentes, a former supporter and apologist,
a “suffocating dictatorship.”8 Cubans, for example,
can be imprisoned for such political “crimes” as being
disrespectful, dangerous, or insulting to the symbols of
the homeland. Nonetheless, the violent overthrow of the
regime is highly unlikely to occur. Cuban civil society is
rather weak, and the opposition is unable to work openly
and in full coordination. There also is no organized
armed opposition within Cuba. The repressive state
machinery operates effectively against real or potential
enemies within both the state apparatus and the society
at large. And if revolutions are said to be led by the
middle classes, Cuba sent it abroad decades ago.9 The
masses are conveniently mobilized and rallied by the
government against internal opponents and dissidents,
as well as against the American hegemon as needed. They


also are reminded of the threat presented by the hordes
of returning exiles claiming restitution for expropriated
and confiscated land and property in spite of the fact
that some exile leaders are seeking reconciliation, giving
reassurances about negotiating property claims, and have
long admitted lacking the wherewithal to help overthrow
the regime by force.10
The Diaspora is riddled with dissension, paranoia,
and distrust, in no small part instigated by the Castro
regime. Indeed, it is a truism that the exile community
long has been penetrated by the Cuban Intelligence
Service (CuIs), a resilient institution that continues to
work aggressively in the United States. Cuba’s Directorio
General de Inteligencia (DGI) successfully has placed spies,
sleeper cells, and illegal operatives who have reported
and sometimes encouraged exile activities and generated
infighting among the various groups. Major Florentino
Aspillaga Lombard, the Cuban DGI resident in Prague
who defected to the United States in 1987 contended
that most, if not all, of the Cuban agents recruited by
the CIA from the mid-1960s onward were doubles-pretending to be loyal to the United States while working
in secret for Havana. Four years later, CIA analysts and
counterintelligence officers glumly concluded the major
was telling the truth. This meant not only that much of
what the agency knew about Cuba was wrong, but also
that a great deal of what Cuba knew about the CIA was
right.11
In a 1998 CNN interview, Castro made the rare
admission that Cuba has dispatched spies across the
United States to gather information about “terrorist
activities” by anti-Castro political groups. He said, “Yes, we
have sometimes dispatched Cuban citizens to the United
States to infiltrate counterrevolutionary organizations,
to inform us about activities that are of great interest


to us.”12 Indeed, Cuban spies have found considerable
success penetrating U.S.-based exile groups. A notable
example is that of Juan Pablo Roque, a former MiG-23
pilot who defected to the United States in 1992, became a
paid source for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and joined the ranks of the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR).
He redefected back to Cuba just days after the early 1996
BTTR shoot-down, denouncing the exile group on Cuban
television, and accusing it of planning terrorist attacks
against Cuba and Castro. Another example involves the
case of Jose Rafael Fernandez Brenes, who jumped ship
from a Cuban merchant vessel in 1988. From 1988-91, he
helped establish and run the U.S. Government-financed
TV Marti, whose signal was jammed from its inception
in March 1990, due in part to frequency and technical
data provided by Fernandez Brenes. Likewise, Francisco
Avila Azcuy ran operations for Alpha 66, one of the most
violent anti-Castro exile groups, all the while reporting
secretly to the FBI and Cuban intelligence. Avila planned
a 1981 raid on Cuba, telling both the FBI and the DGI all
about it. His information helped convict seven members
of Alpha 66 for violating the Neutrality Act by planning
an attack on a foreign nation from U.S. soil. He also
informed on the personal lives and tastes of 40 top antiCastro leaders.13
During the Cold War, the United States rightfully
treated Castro’s regime as a potential threat to our interests
and adopted a policy of isolation and containment.
However, no one seriously believes today that the United
States is planning to conduct offensive combat operations
to overthrow Castro. In the current global environment,
any credible American initiative to effect a regime change
would have to be based not on the old strategic calculus
of the Cold War, but on an estimation of Cuba’s capability
to threaten U.S. security. Wayne S. Smith, former Chief


of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana from 1979-82,
contends there is no threat because we have achieved
our strategic objectives; namely, Cuba has no troops
operating in Africa, and it no longer assists revolutionary
movements and has no military ties with the former Soviet
Union.14 However, on May 6, 2002, Under Secretary of
State John R. Bolton made the allegation that Cuba had
a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability and,
as a state sponsor of terrorism, presented a real threat.
The perception of a Cuban threat is highlighted not by its
military, commercial, and investment ties with China, but
by its aggressive intelligence collection activities targeting
the United States. Castro has maintained Cuba’s role
as an intelligence collection platform previously for the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and now for
China. In particular, operations continue near Havana at
Torrens (also known as Lourdes), the massive 28 squaremile signals intelligence (SIGINT) base set up by the
Soviet Special Forces (GRU) military intelligence in the
mid-1960s.15
In his CNN interview, Castro further denied spying
to collect information on the U.S. military. “We aren’t
interested in strategic matters, nor are we interested in
information about military bases,” he said. This is, of
course, not true. The U.S. Department of State issued a
fact sheet on July 30, 2003, examining Cuba’s history of
espionage against the United States as the latest evidence
that Castro’s regime “has long targeted the United States
for intensive espionage activities.”16 Cuba probably has
shared the output of his intelligence services with China
and other U.S. rivals. The motivation clearly is more than
defensive as Castro, who is pathologically anti-American,
has been engaged in a protracted, asymmetrical conflict
with the United States.17 Over the decades, the dictatorship
has gone from operating training camps for guerrillas and
terrorists, supporting insurgency movements, exporting


revolution, or acting as a Soviet mercenary in proxy
wars, to its current ties and joint operations with Iran and
China--all indicative of a willingness to pursue policies
inimical to American interests.18
The case of Ana Belen Montes, a Puerto Rican who
was the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) top Cuban
analyst until she confessed to spying for Cuba for 16
years (from 1985 to the time of her arrest on September
21, 2001), is of great significance. She was sentenced to
25 years in federal prison in September 2002. Montes did
tremendous damage to our national security by revealing
Pentagon contingency plans, sources, and methods,
as well as giving the Cuban Government the names of
four U.S. covert intelligence officers working in Cuba.
Moreover, as the foremost Department of Defense (DoD)
briefer on Cuba and trainer of new analysts, she gathered
and submitted writings, documents, and profiles
about officials; and influenced policy, recruitment, and
promotional assignments. Her betrayal was significant
due particularly to her influence on policy and strategy.
After the demise of the USSR, a consensus had emerged
among American analysts, reflected in a 1998 DoD report
to Congress, that Castro’s Communist government posed
“a negligible threat to the United States or surrounding
countries.” Montes was a major source of this estimate,
and after her arrest, DIA officials remarked that they had
to discard most of what they thought they knew about
Cuba.19
In June and September 2001, five members of the socalled Red Wasp Network were convicted of espionage or
related crimes. These Cuban spies sought to infiltrate U.S.
Southern Command headquarters. One was convicted
for delivering a message to the Cuban Government that
contributed to the death of four fliers from BTTR who
were shot down in 1996 by Cuban MiGs in international
airspace.20


In 2000, Mariano Faget, a Cuban-born Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) official with 35 years
of service and high security clearance, was caught in a
sting operation and later sentenced to 5 years in prison.
During his years of spying, Faget most likely provided
false papers, classified information, and illegal entry to
Castro’s operatives. Two Cuban diplomats associated
with the case were expelled from the United States for
espionage activities. Earlier, from 1983 to 1998, 15 members
of the Cuban mission to the United Nations (UN) were
expelled for espionage activities, including three who
were handlers for the Wasp Network in 1998.21
An intriguing recent case is that of Alberto Coll, a
Cuban-born lawyer who served in the first George W.
Bush administration as an assistant secretary of defense
and became the Dean of the Strategic Studies Division
at the Naval War College. Like Ana Montes, he, too,
consistently declared that Cuba presented no security
threat, favoring dialogue with Castro and ending the
embargo. As part of his job, he visited Cuba frequently
and was caught making a false statement about his
last visit in 2004. There is no proof that he was a covert
operative, but on July 25, 2005, he was convicted, fined,
and placed on 1-year probation. Coll lost his security
clearance and agreed not to seek work that would involve
classified information. He is now at DePaul University
Law School teaching International law and organizing
academic visits to Cuba. It is conceivable that Coll, a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations, fell into a
traditional “honey trap” operation to recruit him as an
agent of influence.22
Finally, on January 2006, Carlos M. Alvarez Sanchez
and his wife, Elsa Prieto Alvarez, two Cuban exiles
prominent in Miami academic, intellectual, and religious
circles, were arrested and charged with spying since


the 1970s. Assigned by the DGI to infiltrate the Cuban
community, they became close friends with Florida
International University president and community
leader Modesto Maidique and conducted psychological
screening for the Miami-Dade police department.23
From all his spying activities, Castro has gained
invaluable and tradable intelligence about American
military plans, capabilities, sources, methods, and
operations affecting Cuba and other countries. He plays
defense and offense against the United States, his main
enemy, a country to which he dedicates his primary
attention and energy.24 So he probably is well aware of the
ongoing policy shift in the Bush Doctrine. Thus, on May
16, 2006, the U.S. Government announced that it would
restore diplomatic relations with Libya after 27 years of
conflict. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, knowing that a
nuclear program was unfeasible and fearing that after
Afghanistan and Iraq he was next in line, dismantled
his WMD program and closed terrorist training camps,
opening his files to reveal the A. Q. Khan network in
exchange for an end to sanctions, security guarantees,
and removal from the Department of State list of states
sponsoring terrorism. The U.S.-Libya rapprochement,
however, began in 2003 when Libya agreed to pay
restitution to the families of 270 people who died aboard
Pan Am Flight 103, which Libyan agents were responsible
for bombing. Libya agreed that year to end its nuclear and
other WMD programs and allow America and Britain to
verify the process.25
Castro, unlike Qadhafi, had received a promise not
to invade the island from President Kennedy as part of
the deal with the Soviet Union that ended the Missile
Crisis of 1962. While Operation MONGOOSE, led by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy with his brother’s
approval, sought to eliminate Castro, the United States


has kept its promise not to invade the island.26 Since
that time, and despite regular pressure from Cuban
exiles for an armed intervention, the United States
never has desired to invade Cuba nor truly committed
the diplomatic, military, and economic resources
required for the violent overthrow of Castro. In fact,
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice insisted on August
6, 2006, on NBC’s Meet the Press, that an invasion was
not in the works. “I want to lay one thing to rest,” she
said. “The notion that somehow the United States is
going to invade Cuba because there are troubles in
Cuba is simply far-fetched. And it’s simply not true.
The United States wants to be a partner and a friend
for the Cuban people as they move through this period
of difficulty.”
Since the global war on terror, the Iraqi muddle,
and the nuclear proliferation issues raised by Iran and
North Korea are the current foreign policy priorities
of the Bush administration, the United States would
need to feel directly threatened before considering
the use of force against Cuba. So Castro knows, that
notwithstanding U.S. Government official rhetoric,
he is treated as a distraction and will be allowed to
remain in charge as long as he does not cross the red
line--namely, aiding, abetting, harboring, planning,
or conducting acts of terrorism against the American
homeland.27
A Peaceful Transition to Democracy
and a Free Market Economy.
While the Castro brothers are alive, this is doubtful.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was
hope that Cuba might undergo something similar to the
“color” or “flower” revolutions that transformed many
10

of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike Eastern and
Central Europe, however, Cuba’s dissident groups are
small in numbers, thoroughly penetrated by the internal
security forces, betrayed by spies, and embarrassed by
accusations of external support. They seek dialogue as a
means to achieve the regime’s peaceful transformation
but lack access to the masses.28
The University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS) Cuba Transition
Project supported by a grant from the Agency for
International Development (AID) has been examining
the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua
to determine what lessons it might hold for Cuba.29 Two
identified weaknesses of the European model are the
geographic proximity of Cuba to its main opponent,
the United States, and the unique internal historic
conditions existing in Cuba, specifically, five decades
of personalistic authoritarian leadership. Moreover, the
Cuban Communist Party (CCP) remains loyal, there
is no charismatic opposition leader with a solid plan,
no significant anti-Castro student activism in Cuba,
no working class solidarity movement, and the few
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) allowed to
operate in the country are highly restricted.
Adding to the practical problem of stimulating a
peaceful transition is the ambivalent Cuban policy of the
Bush administration. While its official pronouncements
give the impression that it seeks regime change in Cuba,
in fact, it is planning to deal with a post-Castro succession
scenario. On October 10, 2003, Bush established the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC), an
interagency group chaired by then Secretary of State
Colin Powell. The Commission was directed to report
to the President by May 1, 2004, with recommendations
for developing a comprehensive program to achieve the
mission. The five recommendations proposed were:
11

1. Bring about a peaceful, near-term end to the
dictatorship;
2. Establish democratic institutions, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law;
3. Create the core institutions of a free economy;
4. Modernize infrastructure; and,
5. Meet basic needs in the areas of health, education,
housing, and human services.30
Bush formed the U.S. Commission for Assistance to
a Free Cuba “to explore ways we can help hasten and
ease Cuba’s democratic transition.”31 Yet, on December
4, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Noriega
announced that Bush is committed to the “liberation of
Cuba” during the next 4 years. What did he mean by
“liberation”? Certainly not a military intervention or
covert operation to achieve regime change while Cuba
is under Castro. Noriega stated that Washington had a
blueprint of plans for providing social, economic, and
other types of assistance to Cuba in the post-Castro era to
prevent Castro’s supporters from retaining control of the
country after his death. He said that Washington wants
to “ensure that vestiges of the regime don’t hold on.”32
In July 2005, Secretary Rice, who now co-chairs
the Commission together with Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez, announced the appointment of Caleb
McCarry, a former Republican staff member of the
House International Relations Committee, as Cuba
transition coordinator--or point man on regime change
in Cuba. McCarry has a $59 million budget to “hasten the
transition” and prevent Raul Castro, Carlos Lage, Perez
Roque, and other leaders from continuing the current
system.33
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On July 5, 2006, the Commission issued a second
updated report that indicates extensive strategic
planning on the part of the U.S. Government to promote
a full transition to democracy after Castro dies or is
ousted. It is based on the expectation that the Cuban
transition government would be inclined to request
American assistance and unrealistically assumes that
pro-democracy forces within the island would be
bolstered and emboldened by U.S. willingness to provide
assistance. The report considers the first 6 months after
Castro’s demise to be critical if a democratic transition is
going to succeed. A whole range of assistance programs
are included in the planning, ranging from $80 million for
a “democratic fund” for 2 years to help strengthen civil
society to legal experts for election and judicial training,
an aid package, and technical and health assistance. The
report also includes a classified annex of measures to
destabilize the regime which begs the crucial question of
what specific actions might be undertaken to prevent Raul
and others from succeeding Fidel. The report’s credibility
is weakened by the underlying assumption that Castro
will not survive within the next years, the hope for
popular protests and demonstrations in the future, and
the presumption of an American readiness to intervene
directly in internal Cuban affairs upon his death.34
Juan J. Lopez argues that Cuba’s failure to undergo
a transition to democracy is due to a “lack of belief
in political efficacy.” But Cuban exiles and dissidents
have sought international support for Castro’s peaceful
departure from the island into exile in Spain. Castro did
not give any serious consideration to the plan. Then Pope
John Paul II visited Cuba on January 21-25, 1998, and
called for democratic change. The Pope’s visit raised the
hopes of those who wanted to dialogue their way into
a transition, but Castro disregarded his plea and soon
13

thereafter stepped up prosecutions and harassment of
dissidents. It is not a lack of political efficacy on the part
of Cuban people, but the diabolically effective repressive
machinery of the regime that kept them from emulating
their European counterparts.35
Edward Gonzalez has suggested that one of three
regime types that might follow after Castro is a democratic
transition regime drawn from the ranks of dissidents and
opponents.36 However, in 1996 Manuel Marin, a special
European Union (EU) representative, brokered a deal
between the United States and Castro. Under the proposal,
Castro would allow dissidents organized as the Concilio
Cubano the opportunity to meet openly in Havana, and,
in exchange, the United States would provide new loans
and credits. After finding all he needed about the group,
Castro ordered a crackdown on the Concilio members.
This action confirms Aguirre’s view that a democratic
transition regime in unlikely to replace the one-party
rule any time soon because the authoritarian institutions
remain strong and stable.37 James Cason, former Chief
of Mission of the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba from
2002-05, met openly with the dissidents and consistently
denounced Castro through his 3-year stint. But overt or
covert support for dissidents oftentimes amounted to the
kiss of death as the events of March and April of 2003
demonstrated. In that year, European and American
intellectuals saw their support for Castro shaken
and hopes for a peaceful transition dashed when the
government again ordered a crackdown against the prodemocracy opposition. Seventy-five people, including
27 independent journalists, 10 independent librarians,
and signature collectors for the Varela Project--a citizens’
initiative to hold a national referendum on civil liberties-were sentenced to an average of 20 years in prison
following a 1-day trial. Jose Saramago, a Portuguese
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writer who won the 1998 Nobel Prize for literature and
considered himself a close friend of Castro, said Cuba
“has lost my confidence, damaged my hopes, and cheated
my dreams.” Even hardcore supporters joined in signing
a statement issued by the leftist Campaign for Peace and
Democracy entitled “Anti-War, Social Justice, and Human
Rights Advocates Oppose Repression in Cuba.”38
A June 29, 2006, report by the Coordinadora Nacional
de Presos y Ex-Presos Politicos (CNPP), an umbrella
organization of 85 human rights groups in Cuba, revealed
that there are 347 political prisoners in Cuba, of which
121 are prisoners of conscience. In addition, the report
warned about a great new wave of arrests and repressive
measures (“gran ola represiva”) against dissidents and
opponents in the coming months in advance of the
forthcoming Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) in Havana on September 15-16.39
Hoover scholar Bill Ratliff has examined the similarities between post-Mao China and a post-Castro Cuba
and suggested the innovative argument that the Chinese
transition model of development first, then democracy
might be adopted by Cuba. As he notes, however, Fidel has
rejected the Chinese model of socialist capitalism despite
his brother’s open admiration of it.40 It is reasonable to
assume that Cuba can draw many useful lessons from
China to the extent that the two are comparable. Unlike
Cuba, China occupies a vast continental mass inhabited
by a huge population with a history of regional warlords
and linguistic differences. Whether a successor regime
in Cuba might choose to follow the Chinese road is an
open question, however, since the Chinese “model” itself
is still a work in progress. In fact, there is an ongoing
debate among China watchers over whether China will
collapse, democratize, remain authoritarian, or achieve
what Minxin Pei calls “partial reform equilibrium.”41
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Irving L. Horowitz alternatively has suggested
that the Cubans might adopt a Turkish model of
nationalistic military/civilian authoritarian control to
drive development.42 Turkey has developed democratic
traditions over several generations and is accelerating its
transformation into a modern nation in order to achieve
integration with the EU. Turkey has been presented as a
model to the Middle Eastern countries; as a blend of Islam
and democracy, a Muslim country fulfilling European
cultural criteria. It also is a Muslim country with strong
generals in a tough neighborhood and historic conflicts
with Greece. Like Cuba, Turkey occupies a geographically
strategic position; like China and unlike Cuba, Turkey
was once a proud empire. The Turkish military acts
as the guarantor of national legitimacy and secular
republicanism. Since single-party rule ended in 1950, they
intervened in civilian politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, to
maintain the democratic process. Whether Cuba’s FAR
could become the main driver of a democratic transition
after Castro’s departure is an intriguing question. Their
role certainly would be easier than the Turkish military
since in Cuba there are no tribal, ethnic, or religious
conflicts that the armed forces would have to ameliorate,
mediate, or eliminate. The sole historic cleavage from
the pre-Castro era is racial tensions between white and
black Cubans. Since the Revolution, a new one appeared
between the Party “haves” and the “have nots” rest of the
population.
The FAR, nonetheless, is not only the most efficient
and effective nonsectarian institution in the country but
also the main institutional stakeholder with multiple
tasking ranging from national defense, internal security
and repression, to tourism, mining, aviation, and the sugar
industry. Equally important, the FAR has maintained the
revolutionary tradition and has never fired on the people
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since the government came to power. No other military
in Latin America, except the Ejercito Popular Sandinista/
Ejercito Nicaraguense which the FAR helped to create,
has behaved in such a manner.43
Since the FAR will continue to play a most critical role
in any Cuban political system, U.S. policy initiatives could
integrate military-to-military security cooperation and
confidence-building components along the lines of the
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security program of the Center
for Defense Information (CDI). But, the 1989 purge of
Minister of the Interior (MININT)General Jose Abrantes
and the show trial and execution of General Arnaldo
Ochoa Sanchez made it clear to the military and security
services that Fidel and Raul will eliminate rivals ruthlessly
and severely suppress any organized movement within
the armed forces toward liberalization or transition
to democracy.44 Against that historic background and
concerned about the possibility of a bloodbath, exile
leader Carlos Montaner has suggested that, to effect a
peaceful transition, reformers and democrats must form
an alliance after Castro’s death.45
The reality is that no color, flower, or cedar revolution
will occur because Castro and his closest lieutenants have
studied those events very closely, anticipated the relevant
contingencies, and contemplated how to deal with
them. Dominguez argues that they learned four specific
lessons from the fall of Eastern European Communism:
undertake as few political reforms as possible; get rid
of deadwood in the Communist party early on; deal
harshly with potential or evident disloyalty; and do not
allow a formal opposition to organize.46 Julia Sweig, in
turn, identified six elements in Castro’s survival strategy:
alliances at home; a diverse supply network; cultivating
sympathy in the international community; astute use of
the press; manipulating the activities of the Diaspora;
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and taking advantage of its geographic proximity to the
United States.47 Whether they learned four lessons or
used six strategic elements, it is obvious that they have
been doing whatever is necessary to survive and stay
in power. As Bueno de Mesquita notes, authoritarians
are good at limiting strategic coordination activities
by the opposition--such as disseminating information,
recruiting and organizing members, choosing leaders,
and developing strategy to increase power and influence.
Thus, they usually are able to prevent democratization.48
Cuba, the strategic “Key to the Gulf,” the Pearl of the
Antilles, has been a global crossroads of people and
ideas since it was first discovered and settled by Spain
in 1492. In addition to its geopolitical position, Cuba also
has valuable natural resources--nickel, cobalt, iron ore,
copper, manganese, salt, timber, and possibly oil--to trade
in the global economy.49 If there is going to be a transition
in the land of tropical socialism, it characteristically
might be Cuban. To wit, Cuba would not have a so-called
“peaceful transition to democracy” as desired by the
United States and the exiles, but rather at best a transfer
of authoritarian rule devoid of Castro’s personalism.
From a public policy standpoint, moreover, we
must reassess the desirability of pressing for a rapid
Cuban transition to democracy in light of recent findings
indicating that democratizing states are more prone to
start wars than mature democracies or authoritarians.
However, since Cuba is unlikely to start a war with its
neighbors, these studies draw into question the soundness
of the democratic peace hypothesis as applied to the
Cubans.50
A Succession Regime.
A regime based on collective leadership is the most
likely scenario since Fidel himself already has set the
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process in motion. It is anchored on the assumption
that his brother, Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, would
survive Fidel. Raul plays a pivotal role in Fidel’s regime
by occupying four key positions--first vice-president of
the council of state and of the council of ministers, as well
as the general of the army and minister of the FAR. Under
current law, the first vice-president will assume the duties
of the president, and in 1997 Raul was recognized formally
as Fidel’s successor. The Castro clan also includes Fidel’s
firstborn son, Fidel Castro Diaz Balart (“Fidelito”) and five
other sons with his common-law wife, Dalia Soto del Valle,
but apparently no one else has been groomed to replace
Raul. Two overlapping camps of elites loosely identified
as Fidelistas or Raulistas and divided between historicos
(the “barbudos” or “bearded ones” of the revolution) and
the post-revolutionary generations of new Socialist men
and women constitute the winning coalition below the
Castro brothers.51
Fidelistas are mostly historicos in the party and
economic sectors who take a hard line position on
security issues and preservation of the socialist tradition.
Raulistas largely are composed of newer generation
military and technocratic personnel who are strong on
security issues but willing to experiment with economic
development short of a full free market mechanism. They
represent the competing civilian leadership and military
organization aspects of the regime along generational
and ideological fault lines. In addition to Fidel and Raul,
and absent the unknown factor of a dark horse or hidden
clique, the leading players in implementing the strategy
are historico General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, General
Alvaro Lopez Miera, Vice-president Carlos Lage Davila,
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, National Assembly
President Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, Government
Ministers Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz and Yadira Garcia, and
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historicos General Jose Ramon Machado Ventura and
General Juan Almeida in his role as the symbol of the
Afro-Cubans.52
Fidelistas and Raulistas alike are found distributed
throughout the cadres in the FAR, MININT, and security
services, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CDRS), ministries, state enterprises, and managerial
bureaucracy. The Catholic and Protestant church, AfroCuban sects like the santeros, and human rights groups
will play a tertiary role. All these elements will either
coalesce to protect their interests in a post-Castro Cuba
or clash as the collective leadership group vies to retain
power.
The reasons behind Castro’s succession strategy are
pragmatic and understandable. Longevity runs high
among the Castro clan and the possibility remains of
both brothers surviving into the next decade. But what if
events do not follow that order? A collective leadership
approach will cement elite cooptation and maintain the
loyalty of critical elements within the regime.
Castro, the absolute ruler, wants to retain personal
power for as long as he can to protect his dominant
position and interests. Bueno de Mesquita suggests that
for an authoritarian, staying alive politically is a measure
of success; by that measure, Castro is incomparably
successful.53 The Castros not only enjoy the use and abuse
of power but have profited from it. The recent financial
revelations regarding the wealth amassed by Castro over
the decades have put a dent on his façade and have raised
the stakes for survival. Accordingly, the May 5, 2006, issue
of Forbes magazine estimated Fidel Castro’s personal
worth at $900 million, ranking him as the world’s seventh
richest leader. In a speech of May 25, 2006, a visibly upset
Castro challenged Forbes to prove it.54
Forbes’ estimate is imprecise due to Cuban economic
reporting practices and the way it was calculated. They
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assumed that Castro owns about 10 percent of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) based on his
partial ownership of state enterprises such as Havana’s
Convention Center, Medicuba, Cimex, and a few others.
Cuban defectors have been quite consistent over the years
about the extent of Castro’s financial interests in state
enterprises. Major Aspillaga, mentioned above, revealed
that Castro has Swiss bank accounts. The real amount
probably is higher, according to Eugenio Yanez, if one
were to include the larger state enterprises like Artex,
Cubatabaco, Acemex, Cubatour, Caribat, Cubatecnica,
and others.55
The charges of personal corruption at the highest levels
of government are very significant because corruption
is now so endemic that some consider Cuba one of the
world’s most corrupt states. In fact, Castro’s personal
money-making activities in his capacity as Cuba’s ruler
date as far back as a 1960 deal with Nikita Khrushchev,
whereby he would receive honoraria for the publication
of his lengthy speeches and articles in Russian. Unless
proper measures are taken to address corruption, it will
hinder any future regime by inviting increased organized
crime activity and turning the country into a mirror image
of pre-Castro Cuba.56
Castro needs to maintain domestic control and
guarantee external security to secure his position. The
state security and intelligence apparatus are ruthlessly
efficient and constantly monitor and intimidate the
opposition. The historical record since the early beginning
shows that Castro seldom has hesitated to eliminate
suspected or potential rivals and enemies. In 1959,
after the defeat of Batista, for instance, the country was
swamped with popular playing cards (“postalitas”) with
the faces and biographies of revolutionary leaders. Those
of Commander Camilo Cienfuegos were more valuable
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than those of Fidel--i.e., 10 of Camilo traded for 1 of Fidel.
Camilo disappeared early that year in a mysterious plane
accident. Since those days, the growing list of erstwhile
Castro collaborators who were pushed aside or disposed
of has included President Manuel Urrutia, Commander
Hubert Matos, Comandante Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo,
General Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio De La Guardia, General
Jose Abrantes, Carlos Aldana, and Roberto Robaina. In
Ratliff’s pointed words, “it is fatal to be popular in Cuba
unless you are already dead, like Che Guevara.”57
External actors with significant interests in the
ongoing succession process that will be contesting their
agendas in a post-Castro regime include both states
and nonstate actors. The main stakeholder in Cuba’s
future is the United States. China, Venezuela, and Iran
are countries with strategic, security, commercial, and
ideological interests; the European Union, in particular
Spain and England; as well as Canada, Mexico, Bolivia,
and Brazil also have important commercial and financial
interests on the island. Beyond their bilateral foreign
policy considerations with Cuba, these countries also
partake in the global competition for natural resources,
markets, and access to a skilled labor force. Cuba, Bolivia,
and Venezuela also are joined by the Bolivian Alternative
for the Americas (ALBA), a trade and cooperation
agreement in opposition to the unsuccessful U.S. Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Nonstate American
groups with direct or indirect interests in Cuba include
the exiles, business, educational, artistic, and agricultural
groups; NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International,
and Human Rights Watch; think tanks like the Center for
Defense Information; and news media outlets.58
A critical element of Castro’s strategy to retain power
and maintain external security has been the use of Cuban
soft power. Joseph S. Nye has defined soft power as
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“. . . the ability to get what you want by attracting and
persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from
hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of
economic and military might to make others follow your
will.”59
Castro’s manipulation of soft power is global,
sophisticated, and very effective in creating a multiplier
effect. Hal Klepak notes that “Castro’s influence in the
region is subtle. His revolution has survived for almost 50
years, and there are lessons that may be useful for other
national leaders.”60 After almost 5 decades of dictatorship,
repression, and human rights violations, Castro’s media
image as a symbol of defiance remains not only in the
developing world but among so-called “progressive”
circles in the United States and Europe. News media
manipulation of the revolutionary mythology dates back
to the famous Herbert Matthews reports from the Sierra
Maestra in the 1950s, perhaps the classic example of
Cuban disinformation, and has continued to the present
day.61
The success of Cuban soft power strategies also is
manifested in the omnipresent Che Guevara t-shirts,
posters, and berets worn by youths;62 tourist campaigns
touting Cuba as a travel destination; the Venceremos
brigades; globalization of Cuban music, films, theater
productions and cuisine; performances by Cuban ballet
dance troupes, musicians, and salsa bands in global
venues; touring baseball teams; front organizations for
educational and academic exchanges; offers of free medical
education programs and biotechnological training;
medical diplomacy by cadres of volunteer physicians and
health care providers; etc.63 In fact, the regime’s ability to
shape global perceptions has been so effective that former
CIA Cuban specialist Brian Latell failed to recognize
that Castro was truly anti-American for over a decade.
Latell reveals that he had been enthralled with Castro for
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many years and became “disenthralled” in 1976 after “I
finally came to understand that Fidel was pathologically
hostile to the U.S.”64 How this failure to see and clearly
understand Castro for so long might have affected or
biased his analysis, estimates, and recommendations
remains unanswered, however.
Following, I briefly outline the contours of five possible
succession scenarios. They are merely suggestive of
future developments since events in Cuba, whether slow
or sudden, may occur in a drastic manner and we need to
avoid being caught by surprise. One thing that must be kept
in mind, however, is that Castro is a strategic thinker, and
many of his seemingly arbitrary or ad hoc decisions are,
in fact, carefully calculated. It is quite plausible, therefore,
that, like the U.S. Government, the Castro brothers and
their closest lieutenants have held periodic continuity of
government exercises to deal with future contingencies.
For instance, the late General Manuel “Barbarroja”
Piñeiro, the first MININT minister, explained that when
news first arrived about Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia,
the Cuban leader demanded confirmation and then began
to work on the death announcement. In Piñeiro’s words,
“We knew it would have a terrible psychological effect
on our people, all revolutionaries, and people all over the
world--which was why it was important to give them the
news carefully . . .”65
Scenario 1: Fidel and Raul both survive for the
next 3-5 years with declining physical abilities but
functioning mental faculties. The likely course of events
would include minimal changes in external policies and
tactical and strategic rotation of personnel within the
FAR, critical ministries, and the security apparatus to
discourage disloyalty. Problems managing the economy
will remain with increased discontent over housing,
electrical shortages and blackouts, corruption, and
internal repression of dissidents and potential rivals.
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The governing coalition group becomes more Raulista
in membership with the increasing militarization of the
country. Repression is tightened to maintain control,
prevent instability, and demoralize the internal opposition.
Stronger ties are sought with China, Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Iran as countervailing forces against U.S. pressure to
democratize.
Scenario 2: Fidel dies suddenly. This leadership
vacuum leads to the immediate accession to power of
Raul Castro and his minions coupled with a de facto
state of martial law and high military alert. Public
announcement of Fidel’s death might be delayed until
internal security arrangements are in place, and key
military installations, airports, and harbors have been
secured. An official month-long mourning period begins
during which the special purges of potential rivals
and challengers to Raul in the party apparatus and
bureaucracy begin to take place. The sanctification of Fidel
begins in earnest with popular mobilization in staged
events, parades, monument dedications, etc. Pockets of
dissenters and opponents are imprisoned or eliminated
after being activated by agent provocateurs. Unlike the
engineered migrations used by the regime in the past, a
regulated emigration to Florida is allowed as Raul seeks
to avert American intervention and obtain international
acceptance by appearing statesmanlike, poised, and
reassuring in public. Militarized socialism becomes more
institutionalized as loyal Raulistas are inserted in the key
ministries and state enterprises. The University of Miami
Cuba transition group, led by Jaime Zulicki and Brian
Latell, in a simulation of decisionmaking under Raul
immediately after Fidel Castro’s death, concluded the
succession would be smooth and quick.66
Scenario 3: Fidel becomes severely incapacitated or
declines faster than his younger brother. The succession
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process set in motion by Fidel on July 31 was a test run
for a Raulista takeover. After redeploying the armed
forces throughout the island, Raul begins the process of
succession by removing, jailing, or eliminating Fidelistas
to consolidate power. A sort of cultural revolution
to emphasize discipline and purge the ranks begins.
Fidel’s public appearances diminish and are replaced
by broadcast of prepackaged videotaped speeches and
exhortations for special occasions. The transition from
public to electronic appearances will resemble that of
Osama Bin Laden from hiding. Raul increases his personal
public appearances to fill the open spaces vacated by
Fidel. The governing group becomes more firmly Raulista
and less Fidelista, with the consequent militarization of
key civilian ministries. General Abelardo Colome Ibarra,
Minister of the Interior and Raul’s closest friend, leads
the process. Closer military ties with China are sought to
counterbalance American interventionism and provide
an opportunity to play the Cuba-Taiwan card, that is,
trading Chinese penetration of Cuba for U.S. withdrawal
of support for Taiwan.67 Venezuelan commitment to
subsidize oil supplies in exchange for continued health
and educational support are sought.
Scenario 4: Raul dies suddenly, and Fidel is aging
physically but mentally in full faculty. A major
succession crisis occurs as Fidel and his closest lieutenants
might face an internal power struggle. Raulistas in the
military and security services might move quickly to
purge Fidelistas in the Communist Party and CDRs.
An attempted purge of military ranks led by General
Abelardo Colome Ibarra, Raul’s closest friend and a
historico, leads threatened Raulistas to defect, while
others appeal to the United States for intervention. Elite
groups within the military and entrepreneurial sectors
claiming ability to lead and maintain stability and order
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clash with Fidelistas seeking to mobilize the masses on
patriotic and ideological grounds. Castro loyalists seek
external support from Venezuela and China to retain
control. There is an increased possibility of a bloodbath
initiated by an attempt on Castro’s life coupled by a
military coup.
Scenario 5: Raul becomes severely incapacitated,
and Fidel is aging with reduced mental faculty.
General Abelardo Colome Ibarra and the succession
command conduct purges to maintain control and
prevent internal dissension from spreading to the general
population. Increased defections, an attempted coup,
and assassinations are possible. Repressive machinery is
tightened while elites vie for power. A very dangerous
and unstable situation develops as both brothers might
be kept alive temporarily to be displayed as symbols of
unity or eliminated followed by a declaration of regime
change and appeals for external help and support. A
potential bloodbath might follow as loyal military units
move to establish order, clashing with popular groups on
the streets. A military junta assumes control but is unable
to garner popular support or mobilize the population.
As dissension spreads, the tourist industry comes to a
standstill, and the economy begins to tilt toward collapse.
Waves of mass emigration ensue, and an international
crisis develops as the United States moves to blockade the
island and interdict vessels. The possibility of a military
confrontation with the FAR increases as members of the
regime seek to divert attention from the internal struggle
by unifying the population against a common enemy
threatening the national sovereignty.
Implications.
Cuba has undergone a nontransition from
Communism. Altogether, the succession scenarios
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outlined above highlight a set of issues facing both
the United States and the Cubans regarding security,
authoritarian control, stability, leader indispensability,
institutionalization, and elite cooptation. They confirm
that we currently are engaged in a Castro death watch,
waiting for the so-called “biological solution” and the
aftermath of a succession process leading to some sort of
collective leadership. In the meantime, we need to search
for a clear understanding of the internal rivalries, factions,
and shifting balance of power within the present regime.
For decades, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been
dominated by a policy of isolation through an embargo
on trade and travel restrictions. Wayne Smith, who once
wrote that Castro may be the best guarantor of Cuba’s
peaceful transition to a market-oriented economy and
more democratic government, has long argued that lifting
the embargo would deprive Castro of the U.S. threat and
open up the system to transformation.68
Bill Ratliff and Roger Fontaine want a policy of
engagement by lifting the embargo because, from their
perspective, Castro has more to gain from the sanctions
as they provide him with a scapegoat for his own
repression and economic failures.69 Castro would never
let engagement happen, however, because, as Carlos
Fuentes accurately noted, “he needs his American enemy
to justify his own failings.”70 Ratliff and Fontaine make
that point themselves when they note that “whenever
Washington has lightened up, Castro has tightened up
and effectively prevented further improvements.”71
Paradoxically, the unconditional lifting of the embargo
might even strengthen Castro’s hold by providing him
with another victory over the United States and raising
his global standing once more.72
James Petras, a hardcore Marxist supporter of
Castro who once called the dissidents American-paid
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propagandists, reluctantly has admitted six obvious
failures of the Cuban government unrelated to the
embargo.73 He listed them as being a huge housing crisis
(one million units needed), a health system infrastructure
that is worse than some African countries, a failed energy
policy leading to “apagones” or blackouts that people
use to write graffiti against the government, high level
corruption, racial discrimination after 40 years of social
revolution, and an egocentric Castro leadership that
permeates all sectors.74 Likewise, leftist Maurice Halperin,
who began visiting Cuba in 1935 and as an octogenarian
returned to the country for 1 month in the 1990s, blamed
Castro for the problems of the country.75 In sum, Castro
needs the embargo to sustain his totalitarian regime and
will not cooperate effectively in its elimination, while the
United States will not lift the embargo unconditionally
without a move toward democracy and a market
economy. Whether a succession regime would be
more willing to cooperate with the United States is an
open question ultimately to be answered by the type of
unfolding scenario.
We have an opportunity to observe and test-run
for how long, how well, and in what manner a postCastro successor regime might exercise power. On
July 31, the radio broadcast statement read by Carlos
Valenciaga, Castro’s secretary, announced the dictator’s
provisional delegation of seven different power positions
to 11 different functionaries due to an “acute intestinal
crisis, with sustained bleeding, that obliged me to face a
complicated surgical operation.”
To his brother and official successor, Raul Castro,
he delegated his three functions as First Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCP),
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (FAR), and
President of the Council of State and Government.
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His roles as “principal promoter” of national and
international public health programs, education, and
energy were delegated respectively to Dr. Jose Ramon
Balaguer Cabrera, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura,
Esteban Lazo Hernandez, and Carlos Lage Davila, all
members of the CCP Political Bureau. Since Castro also
personally managed and prioritized the funding of the
three programs, in his absence a three-man commission
composed of Carlos Lage Davila; Felipe Roque, Minister
of Foreign Relations; and Francisco Soberon Valdes,
Minister-President of the Central Bank, was established
to disburse the monies.
In proclaiming this power distribution, Castro
disclosed to the world the possible contours of his
succession plan. As expected, Raul assumed the mantle
of power in a collective leadership system composed of
Fidelistas in charge of the economic and social programs
and Raulistas in charge of the armed forces. In the mix,
we find older generation Machado Ventura and AfroAmerican Lazo Hernandez, and Lage Davila and Felipe
Roque of the younger generation.
In a well-choreographed show of humility, the
proclamation presented this arrangement as a “task
recommended” to the Communist Party and it “begs” the
postponement of the dictator’s 80th birthday celebration
until December 2, Cuban Armed Forces Day and the 50th
anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.
CONCLUSION
For better or for worse, Castro’s place in history already
has been established. For almost 50 years, the Cuban
people have suffered political repression and tyranny
under his one-man rule. On the other hand, the UN
Human Development Index (HDI) Report for Year 2005,
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relying on data from 2003 and before, ranks Cuba (with an
HDI of 0.817) at No. 52 out of 177 countries--above Mexico
and Panama, but below Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and
Argentina.76 Whether history will absolve or condemn
him will depend on what happens to the long-suffering
Cuban people after his demise. Fidelismo/Castroism, not
being a true ideology like Marxism or even Al-Qa’idism,
will probably dissipate and die with him. It is quite likely
that his political legacy might be a return to traditional
Latin American politics of military rule or weak civilian
governments beholden to military leaders. In that regard,
De Mesquita’s useful insight that authoritarian regimes
are difficult to dislodge because they are growing more
sophisticated and that authoritarianism leads to stability
is quite apropos.77
In a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), post-Saddam
Hussein world, the United States can ill afford a Cuban
collapse and attendant instability. An authoritarian
successor regime might be preferable to a failed state.
This is the reason why an American military intervention
to depose Castro or his successor is neither advisable nor
likely. While Castro is alive, American foreign policy
toward Cuba will remain the choreographed pas de deux
of the past 5 decades. An uncomfortable and conflictual
relationship is one whose organizing principle is Cuban
anti-Americanism and American isolation of Cuba
encouraged by Fidel Castro’s dictatorial “kakistocracy”
(rule of the worst citizens).
The inevitable passing of Castro will constitute
good and transformative news for Cuba if progress is
made along a range of issues from development of true
and honest representative institutions of governance
to improvement of the Cuban people’s quality of life.
Cubans will have to overcome the long shadow cast by a
culture of authoritarian one-man rule where, for decades,
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individual initiatives have not been allowed to surface
and prevail because Castro, the micromanager par
excellence, had to either approve or direct them all. The
overall post-Castro American foreign policy objective
should be to engage the succession regime and encourage
a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally-generated
democratization, the rule of law, and transparency
in exchange for an across-the-board normalization of
relations with the island. U.S. military command will need
to perform regular and timely updating of contingency
planning to interdict vessels to and from the island and to
protect and evacuate American diplomatic personnel and
tourists in case of violent unrest.78 As the 2006 report of
the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba reflects, we
must be at the ready to propitiate the process, since in the
final denouement, the vested military and civilian elites
will inexorably begin a struggle for power postponed by
Castro’s longevity, and they will seek powerful allies.
When that time arrives, in cauda venenum, preventing a
bloodbath, avoiding a total economic collapse, foreign
intervention, and massive uncontrolled migration to
Florida will be the biggest challenges we will face from
Cuba since January 1, 1959.
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